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The Issue Squarely Met
Toward an Explanation of Iowans'
Racial Attitudes, 1865-1868
ROBERT R . DYKSTRA
IOWANS have good grounds for priding themselves on their
forebears' encounter with racial discrimination in the post-Civil
War era. Consider the magnitude of pioneer Iowans' triumph:
one of the most racist territories in the North in the 1840s, Iowa
by the 1860s had transformed itself into one of the most
egalitarian states in the Union. What Hubert H. Wubben tells us
of the color prejudice that nevertheless infected Iowa in those
years does not diminish this resounding achievement, but in fact
enhances it: Iowans of the 1860s opted for racial justice despite
prevailing opinion—in the Hawkeye State as elsewhere—that
black Americans constituted an inferior caste legitimately
denied civil equality. Why Iowans did what they did is, in a
sense, less interesting than that they did it at all.^
A proper appreciation of their achievement includes re-
emphasizing the profoundly negative role of Iowa's early
Democratic party. The heavy-handed racism of Iowa's Demo-
crats, so unpleasantly observable in the 1860s, had been ap-
parent from the party's beginning, and was only the most ob-
noxious aspect of its hopelessly reactionary character. The
Democratic party, in fact, dominated Iowa through its first six-
teen years as a separate political entity, and Iowa's public policy
on matters of slavery and race reflected that unfortunate
hegemony with exceeding clarity.
Let three examples suffice: First, in the late 1840s Iowa was
the only free state in the Union whose legislators resisted in-
1. All references to Wubben cite his article, "The Uncertain Trumpet:
Iowa Republicans and Black Suffrage, 1860-1868," in this issue of the Annals.
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structing its congressional delegation to support the Wilmot
Proviso, which would have banned slavery from the nation's
newly acquired western territories. Second, Iowa was the only
free state whose United States senators both voted in favor of
the notorious Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. Third, Iowa's statute
books and its constitution not only contained the usual racially
discriminatory "black code" common to most northern states,
but its general assembly in 1851 enacted the North's first "exclu-
sion law"—forbidding free black migration into a state—to be
passed in the nineteenth century. Early Iowa's political image,
in consequence, was not an enviable one.^
The overthrow of this reactionary regime occurred, as is
well known, in 1854, when the state's Free Soilers and Whigs
finally coalesced and captured the statehouse, in 1856 trans-
forming themselves into a Republican party and delivering
Iowa's electoral vote to the nation's first Republican presidential
candidate, John C. Fremont.' The following year Iowans par-
ticipated in the first of a series of popular referenda on civil
rights that measured, at roughly decade-length intervals, their
attitudes toward blacks.
Iowa was not the only state to hold such referenda on prop-
ositions aimed at extending the liberties of northern blacks. But
among the two dozen or so such referenda held in the North in
the mid-nineteenth century, the Iowa referenda stand out as
unique. The first of the three, Iowa's black suffrage proposition
of 1857, won a mere 10 percent of the ballots cast, representing
2. The failure by 1849 of the Democratically controlled Iowa legislature,
alone among those of the free states, to instruct its United States senators to
support the Wilmot Proviso was frequently noted in the nation's Free Soil
party press. See, for example, the Washington (D.C.) National Era, 26 April
1849. Senatorial votes on the Fugitive Slave Law are displayed in Holman
Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Compromise of 1850 (New
York, 1964), appendix A. Iowa's 1851 black exclusion law is placed in ap-
propriate context in Jo Ann Manfra, "Northern Exclusionary Measures and
the Privileges and Immunities of Free Blacks, 1778-1857: An Unexamined
Theme in Antislavery Constitutionalism" (LL.M. thesis. Harvard Law School,
1979). New Jersey and Massachusetts passed exclusion laws in the 1780s, but
the former had been repealed in 1798 and the latter in 1834. Ibid., 15, 88n.
3. David S. Sparks, "The Birth of the Republican Party in Iowa,
1854-1856," Iowa Journal of History 54 (January 1956), 1-34; Morton M.
Rosenberg, Iowa an the Eve of the Civil War: A Decade of Frontier Politics
(Norman, Okla., 1972), chapters 4, 6.
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one of the two worst civil-rights referenda defeats on record. In
the second, the black suffrage referendum of 1868, the proposi-
tion won 57 percent of the ballots cast, being the first civil-rights
proposition to gain a majority in any state where voters knew
unequivocally what they were voting for or against. Finally,
Iowa's third referendum, the 1880 proposal to open the general
assembly to black membership, won by a landslide: 64 percent
of the ballots. Thus it is not the 1868 referendum alone that
compels admiration; it is instead the astonishing political ac-
complishment by which, in just twenty-three years, a large
population's positive attitude in a matter of racial equality rose
by over 50 percentage points.*
The state's judicial hostility to racial segregation in the
post-Civil War era also bears emphasis, since it, too, proves to
have been unique. In an era in which the "separate-but-equal"
doctrine was employed to legitimize racially segregated public
facilities, the popularly elected Iowa supreme court ruled
against separate-but-equal public schools in 1868 and again
seven years later. It did the same for public accommodations,
specifically in the case of a segregated Mississippi River steam-
boat, in 1873. In doing so, the Iowa court employed a
twentieth-century definition of equal rights that proved to be
very far in advance of its time.'
Whatever Iowans' collective beliefs by the late 1860s, their
4. Iowa's first two referenda may be compared with others in Tom L.
McLaughlin, "Grass-Roots Attitudes toward Black Rights in Twelve
Nonslaveholding States, 1846-1869," Mid-America 56 (July 1974), 176. The
author presents an incorrect percentage for Iowa's 1857 antiblack vote,
however, which was 89.6 rather than 85.9. See Robert R. Dykstra, "Iowa:
'Bright Radical Star,' " in Radical Republicans in the North: State Politics Dur-
ing Reconstruction, ed. James C. Mohr (Baltimore, 1976), 168, 190n. Only
Colorado's 1865 black suffrage referendum yielded greater hostility to blacks
(89.8 percent) than Iowa's 1857 plebiscite. After two previous defeats, Min-
nesota's 1868 black suffrage referendum fared slightly better than Iowa's that
same year, but apparently only because Minnesota's Republican leadership
had submitted the constitutional question to voters as "an amendment of Sec-
tion 1, Article 7"—that is, without any direct reference to a racially impartial
franchise. Ibid., 169-170.
5. Ibid., 186. It seems entirely relevant that Iowa Supreme Court Justice
Chester C. Cole, the Harvard-educated former Democrat who in 1870 became
the court's chief justice, boasted of having been an early proponent of black
suffrage. In 1865, according to an authorized biographical sketch, "he came
out boldly and unequivocally in favor of negro suffrage, in an open letter writ-
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collective behavior on matters of racial justice, compared to the
rest of America, was of high quality indeed.*
WHY DID Iowans approve black suffrage in 1868? The answer,
which I gave on the previous occasion cited by Professor Wub-
ben, is that the state's Republican voters supported it at the
polls. And why did Republican voters support it? Because the
state's Republican leadership wanted it approved, and made the
support of black suffrage a straightforward test of loyalty to the
party and, indeed, to the Union itself.
Wubben does not dispute these findings, which embrace
matters of proximate causation. Instead he asks a more fun-
damental question: Why did the Iowa Republican leadership
want black suffrage to succeed at the polls? His own answer is
that it was simply a fluke, given that most Iowans in the 1860s
appear to have been racists. What happened, he suggests, is that
through some unaccountable political accident the delegates to
the 1865 Republican party convention voted a strong black suf-
frage plank into the platform for that year, committing the
party to revision of the state's racist constitution. Finding them-
selves stuck with the convention's oddly progressive handi-
work. Republicans had no political choice but to push the issue
through to success in 1868. Wubben therefore views this as hav-
ing been a victory for "policy" rather than a genuine commit-
ment to the civil equality of blacks. His larger point, then, takes
ten to Mr. Windsor, his old friend and Presbyterian brother in Taylor County,
and was probably the first man of influence in the state to put himself thus
publicly on record in favor of this then unpopular measure, which he fear-
lessly defended, ably arguing that it was right and reasonable, and that justice
to the colored race demanded it." A. T. Andreas, Illustrated Historical Atlas
of the State of Iowa, reprint ed. (Iowa City, n.d.), 363.
6. It is important to be absolutely clear here. Iowa's accomplishment in
the post-Civil War period was in outlawing what psychologist James M. Jones
terms "institutional" racism: "those established laws, customs, and practices
[that] systematically reflect and produce racial inequalities in American so-
ciety . . . whether or not the individuals maintaining those practices have
racist intentions." This differs from what Jones calls "individual" and
"cultural" racism, which embrace beliefs about black inferiority that have
served to legitimize institutional racism. See Jones, Prejudice and Racism
(Reading, Mass., 1972), especially 118, 131, 148. Thus, Iowans acted strongly
against institutional racism despite the existence among them of considerable
individual and cultural racism.
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the form of a moral judgment: the Iowa Republican party did a
good thing, but for a bad reason.
This is not the place for a disquisition on means and ends.
As every historian knows, however, less-than-noble motives
have often led to good ends, and—unless the actual means
employed to accomplish a good end prove to have been intrin-
sically evil—we normally experience no problem in evaluating
the accomplishment as good. A few historians, for example,
have made scholarly careers out of being cynical toward the fact
that slavery's abolition did not always proceed according to
high moral purpose, but none of them, one assumes, would
argue that the death of slavery was thereby morally wrong. The
writings of such historians are primarily useful in helping to ex-
plain how so many millions of white Americans who had
agitated and prayed and voted for emancipation of the slaves
could then fail to follow through on the logic of the antislavery
crusade by fighting more effectively for the civil rights of free
blacks. North and South.' But in postwar Iowa the ultimate
logic of the antislavery crusade did express itself in a civil liber-
ties movement of such vigor, compared to other states, that
cynicism seems singularly misplaced.'
7. Over the past several years, scholars of northern racist attitudes have
been drawn into a lively debate among scholars of southern Reconstruction,
who have divided themselves into what may be thought of as "pessimist" and
"optimist" schools. The pessimists stress the failures, lost opportunities, and
essentially conservative nature of Reconstruction policies, and attribute them
to certain inherent weaknesses in the nation's Republican party leadership, of
which, they insist, a racial prejudice virtually indistinguishable from that of
white southerners was the most damaging. The optimists, on the other hand,
stress Reconstruction's achievements, and lay primary responsibility for its
ultimate failure at the feet of institutional constraints on effective federal
policy—the nineteenth-century deference to states' rights, for example—and
strongly dispute the allegation that there was little to choose between the two
major parties with respect to attitudes toward blacks. Thus my preliminary
work on Iowa has been cited in support of the optimists. See Michael Les
Benedict, "Equality and Expediency in the Reconstruction Era: A Review
Essay," Civil War History 23 (December 1977), 325; idem, "Racism and
Equality in America," Reviews in American History 6 (March 1978), 20n. On
the other hand. Professor Wubben's article accords well with the pessimist
historiographical position. For perhaps the most important recent statements
of that position see William Gillette, Retreat from Reconstruction, 1869-1879
(Baton Rouge, 1979), as well as a number of the essays in Otto H. Olsen, ed..
Reconstruction and Redemption in the South (Baton Rouge, 1980).
8. That Iowa's nineteenth-century civil rights record seems too good to be
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With respect to color prejudice, of course, there is nothing
gained by attempting to make nineteenth-century Iowans better
than they were. The results of the 1857 referendum still speak
for themselves: 90 percent of Iowa's voters opposed civil equal-
ity for black Iowans, revealing attitudes on the part of both
Republicans and Democrats that obviously persisted into the
war years and are widely reflected in private correspondence
and newspapers, as Professor Wubben is at pains to point out.
But a few words on Republican editorial hostility toward inter-
racial sex and interracial marriage would be in order, since that
phenomenon carries so much of the weight of Wubben's argu-
ment and appears to be so decisive in demonstrating the depths
of Republican racism.
Expressed concern about racial "amalgamation" need not
be taken seriously as a measure of Iowans' racial attitudes in the
1860s, the reason being that miscegenation has provoked
universal hostility throughout American history. North and
South, East and West, down to the present day. As recently as
1963, for example, almost half the states in the Union—
including Indiana, Nebraska, Wyoming, Utah, and Idaho—
still had laws against interracial marriage, and 64 percent of
Americans supported them. The United States Supreme Court
true has recently attracted the attention of others besides Wubben. Robert
Cook, a doctoral student from Oxford University, according to columnist
Walt Shotwell, is "convinced [that] much of this do-good history that rubs off
on [Iowa's] Republicans was accidental; actually some Republican leaders
were 'unprincipled people' whose real motive was to use blacks to control the
South." See Shotwell in Des Moines Register, 27 April 1983. Cook's view-
point, if accurately conveyed, is that of the Reconstruction pessimist school,
which stresses that much Republican party behavior in the 1860s and 1870s
was blatantly political rather than authentically concerned with uprooting
slavery and racism. Cook evidently wishes to enhance that line of argument
by devising a negative interpretation of Iowans' attitudes and actions. Iowans
of the Civil War era, in this respect, are in good historiographical company:
scholars recently have had to defend the Great Emancipator himself from such
criticism. See, for example, Otto H. Olsen, "Abraham Lincoln as a Revolu-
tionary," Civil War History 24 (September 1978), 213-224; Peyton McCrary,
Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment (Princeton,
1978); and especially LaWanda Cox's brilliantly persuasive Lincoln and Black
Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership (Columbia, S.C., 1981). For the
"fallacy of responsibility as cause" involved in the search for human agents to
blame for Reconstruction's failure, see David Hackett Fischer, Historians'
Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York, 1970), 182-183.
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put an end to all such laws in 1967, but nine years later 34 per-
cent of Americans still favored them.' And of course the
newsworthy 1983 Supreme Court decision against South Caro-
lina's Bob Jones University involved a religious stricture against
interracial dating, which remains to this day an enormously
volatile issue. Belaboring nineteenth-century Iowans for hostil-
ity to "race-mixing" makes about as much sense as applauding
them for favorable attitudes toward motherhood and God.
Even Iowa's civil-rights activists, not excluding Edward
Russell, felt themselves compelled to deny they favored inter-
racial "social" equality, a disclaimer any scholar of the nine-
teenth century will recognize as the standard response by racial
progressives everywhere to the ubiquitous specter of miscegena-
tion. Giving special credence to such sad, politically necessary
utterances, of course, is to make meaningless any distinction at
all between the relatively enlightened and the wholly reac-
tionary. ^ ^
As for the 1865 Republican party convention. Professor
Wubben argues that "the victory of black suffrage in the state
was largely assured once the convention voted to promote it." If
this be so, then any ultimate moral judgment of the Republi-
cans' civil-rights campaign of the late sixties may be said to rest
primarily on what transpired at that uniquely decisive gather-
ing. Republican motives in the 1865 convention, in other words,
are the key to Republican behavior in 1868. Were those motives
good or bad?
Professor Wubben mainly finds them mysterious: he can-
not fathom why—given the racism of Iowans in general and
Iowa Republicans in particular—black suffrage overwhelmingly
carried the convention. Is he suggesting that a small ultra-
radical cabal somehow quietly engineered, cleverly horse-
traded, or arrogantly ramrodded black suffrage through the
unknowing, naive, or somehow intimidated gathering? Let us
examine the possibility.
9. George Eaton Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural
Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination, 4th ed. (New York,
1972), 502-504; D. Garth Taylor et al., "Attitudes toward Racial Integration,"
Scientific American 238 (June 1978), 43; Thomas F. Pettigrew, "The Mental
Health Impact," in Impacts of Racism on White Americans, ed. Benjamin P.
Bowser and Raymond G. Hunt (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1981), 114.
10. Russell's disclaimer ("there is not and cannot be any such thing as
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The names of 663 individuals are listed as delegates to the
convention, making it, according to the editor of the Des
Moines Register, "one of the largest deliberative bodies ever
convened in the State. . . . "" A number of distinguished
political figures came as delegates: Congressmen Josiah B. Grin-
nell and Hiram Price, former governor (and future United States
senator) Samuel J. Kirkwood, Lieutenant Governor Enoch W.
Eastman, Adjutant General (and former New Hampshire gover-
nor) Nathaniel B. Baker, and Peter Melendy, United States mar-
shal for the District of Iowa. Military officers of high political
standing included James B. Weaver (future congressman and
Greenback and Populist presidential candidate), James A.
Williamson, and Marcellus M. Crocker, the popular general
who would forthrightly endorse black suffrage later that sum-
mer. Future governor William Larrabee, Henry P. Schölte
(patriarch of the Pella Dutch), and former newspaper editor
Jacob Rich, shortly to achieve prominence as William B.
Allison's political manager, also counted as notables. Editors of
important urban newspapers present as delegates included Ed-
ward Russell of the Davenport Gazette, Frank W. Palmer of the
Des Moines Register (a future congressman), Clark Dunham of
the Burlington Hawk-Eye, and Charles Aldrich, lately of the
Dubuque Times. (Benjamin F. Gue, the Fort Dodge editor, at-
tended the convention, but not as a delegate, seeking and win-
ning nomination as the party's candidate for lieutenant gover-
nor.)
At least nineteen delegates, among them Grinnell, Price,
and Kirkwood, had been present at the creation of the Iowa
Republican party in 1856, but only in Kirkwood's Johnson
County delegation did such "charter" Republicans make up as
much as a third of the members. At least five former Free Soil
activists attended, the most prestigious being Major Henry
O'Connor, the Irish-born former Kansas freedom-fighter and
social equality") is quoted in G. Galin Berrier, "The Negro Suffrage Issue in
Iowa—1865-1868, Annals of Iowa 39 (Spring 1968), 250.
11. The official convention minutes, containir\g a list of delegates, ap-
peared in the Iowa State Daily Register (Des Moines), 15 June 1865. The quote
is from ibid., 14 June 1865. A total of 664 persons are listed as delegates,
although the original delegate from Carroll County was later disqualified.
Worth and Wright counties are noted only as "Represented."
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Civil War combat veteran, now a Muscatine lawyer, whom
Iowans would elect as their attorney general a year hence. At
least one old Liberty party man, H. T. Reid of Lee County, sym-
bolically represented the Republicans' distant ancestry: the
political abolitionism of the 1840s.^ ^
Such men, however, accounted for only a tiny minority of
the 663 delegates, most of whom had been drawn from the
historically anonymous party rank-and-file. Each county had
been permitted to send at least one delegate, but the weighting
system that defined the size of each delegation ("one additional
delegate for every hundred votes, and fractional part of a hun-
dred over fifty, including the Soldiers' vote, cast at the late
Presidential election for the Union electoral ticket") gave the
numerical advantage to delegations from heavily Republican ur-
ban counties such as Scott, Lee, and Linn, which had been allot-
ted the largest delegations: 34, 32, and 29 respectively. But
distinctly nonurban Henry County—that venerable bastion of
antislavery politics—followed close behind with 27. The con-
vention's designers, clearly enough, had sought to achieve the
most scrupulous geographical reflection possible of the state's
rank-and-file Republican strength."
Only seventy-two of Iowa's ninety-nine counties sent
representatives, however, and many delegations consisted of
fewer members than authorized. But whoever represented a
county cast that county's entire authorized vote. Clayton
County, allotted twenty-six delegates, actually sent only five
men to the convention. The rules permitted these five to cast 5.2
votes each to form Clayton's 26 total votes. Thus the 663
delegates found themselves entitled to cast a grand total of
nearly 900 votes.
12. For the names of all known delegates to the Iowa Republican party's
first convention see Louis Pelzer, "The Origin and Organization of the
Republican Party in Iowa," ¡owa Journal of History 4 (October 1906),
521-525. A listing of Liberty and Free Soil party activists is included in Ward
Robert Barnes, "Anti-Slavery Politics in Iowa, 1840-1856" (M.A. thesis.
University of Iowa, 1968), appendix A.
13. For the rules allocating delegates see H. M. Hoxie (for the Republican
State Central Committee) in Iowa State Daily Register, 13 June 1865. Henry
County had fielded Iowa's first Liberty party ticket back in 1843. See Robert
R. Dykstra, "White Men, Black Laws: Territorial Iowans and Civil Rights,
1838-1843," Annals of Iowa 46 (Fall 1982), 430.
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Could many delegates have been unaware that black suf-
frage might come before them at the convention? Probably
drawing up the 1865 Republican nominations, especially for
governor, stirred more interest among the delegates than did the
specific makeup of the platform they would write. Yet the
dullest must have had at least some inkling of the importance of
the party platform in that very political first postwar year. Such
a document, as political scientist Benjamin Ginsberg reminds us,
is designed less for voters than for the leadership: "The com-
pleted platform is a symbolic contract among the party's major
factions—a contract in which each important faction has stated
the terms on which it has agreed to cooperate with the . . . par-
ty's campaign efforts."" And those Republicans importantly
committed to extending the civil rights of blacks had given
ample warning that they intended to make their presence felt.
Edward Russell, as Professor Wubben reminds us, had
publicly urged the party to endorse black suffrage nearly a
month before the delegates met, and Iowa's editors of both par-
ties lost little time in bringing the controversial proposal before
their readers. In addition, prominent newspapers throughout
the North had begun discussing proposals to enfranchise ex-
slaves in the South as a means of preventing the resurgence of
the old white power structure there—an idea Frank Palmer's
Register had introduced to Iowans as early as February 1865.
Black suffrage, when it came specifically before the convention
delegates, should have come as no complete surprise.
The committee on resolutions, charged with devising the
1865 party platform, had initial authority over all campaign
proposals. It consisted of one delegate from each of the state's
twelve congressional districts. Five political notables made up a
committee minority: James W. McDill, a future congressman;
George W. McCrary, a future congressman and United States
secretary of war; editors Edward Russell and Frank Palmer,
who had instigated the campaign for black suffrage, and Jacob
Rich, who, as editor of the Quasqueton Guardian back in 1857,
had been the only newspaperman in the state brave enough to
suggest that Republicans vote in favor of black suffrage that
14. Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen
Control, and Popular Acquiescence (Reading, Mass., 1982), 125.
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year." Benjamin Gue, a fourth editorial proponent of black suf-
frage, was first appointed to the committee, but then removed
when it was disclosed that he was not an official delegate.
Russell's proposal for a strong and forthright party en-
dorsement of black suffrage, however, evidently did not carry
even the platform committee egalitarians: a few years later
Russell would recall "the tremor of the eleven prudent men in
the Committee on Platform, when one Radical member would
not abandon his conviction [in deference] to their fears. . . . ""
But his progressive colleagues did join Russell in forcing through
the committee a compromise Resolution 4 that, importantly
enough, endorsed the principle underlying a racially impartial
suffrage: "with proper safe-guards to the purity of the ballot-
box, the elective franchise should be based upon loyalty to the
Constitution and Union, recognizing and affirming the equality
of all men before the law."
This victory was not enough for Russell. After the party
platform had been read from the podium and "received with en-
thusiastic applause," Russell, from the convention floor, moved
as an addition to Resolution 4 the following phrase: "therefore,
we are in favor of amending the Constitution of our State by
striking out the word 'white' in the article on suffrage." The con-
vention's presiding officer ruled that a move to table Russell's
motion would table the entire report of the resolutions commit-
tee, which forced the delegates to settle the question in open
discussion.
Benjamin Gue left us our only substantive description of
15. In June 1857 Rich had deplored the fact that Iowa's proposed constitu-
tion did little for blacks: 'The Constitution may be adopted and yet the negro
have no more rights than he has at present. We confess that this is our great
objection to it." Six weeks later he quietly encouraged a prosuffrage vote in
the referendum by printing a facsimile of the Buchanan County Republican
ballot that phrased the suffrage question as follows: "Shall the word 'White' be
stricken out of the article on the 'Right of Suffrage?'—YES." So far as I have
been able to discover, this was the only instance in which an Iowa editor sug-
gested that his readers support the 1857 proposition. See Quasqueton Guar-
dian, 13 June, 1 August 1857. For biographical data on Rich see George E.
Roberts, "The Career of Jacob Rich," Iowa Journal of History 13 (April 1915),
165-174.
16. Quoted in Berrier, "Negro Suffrage," 260. Unless cited differently,
from this point on all information on proceedings within the convention has
been extracted from the official minutes (see note 11).
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the debate. "Many of the timid delegates were alarmed and
made strong efforts to persuade Mr. Russell to withdraw his
resolution," reports Gue. "But he refused, and made a vigorous
defense of his measure." Several delegates, he adds, then rose in
opposition to it." They included Josiah Tracy, the genial Bur-
lington lawyer who had just been elected chairman of the
Republican State Central Committee, perhaps F. W; Cowles of
Wapello County, and either W. G. Sample or H. W. Sample,
delegates from Lee. But far and away the most prestigious
spokesman for the opposition was Congressman J. B. Grinnell,
the urbane, nationally prominent clergyman, educator,
publicist, and promoter, and, what was perhaps most salient in
the context of the moment, one of Iowa's most distinguished
antislavery activists of the late 1850s.
Explains Gue: "Grinnell and many who opposed the
Russell amendment were in favor of the principle for which it
stood, but opposed a bold declaration for the reform as im-
politic and liable to bring party defeat." The congressman and
others argued that many Republican voters, while strongly anti-
slavery, opposed black suffrage, "and it was urged," says Gue,
"that they held the balance of power in Iowa politics and that
this amendment would drive them from the party."" As Iowa
City's Republican editor Nathan H. Brainerd put it, Russell's
motion "elicited a warm debate, many of those opposing it say-
ing that the resolution as originally reported covered the whole
ground, and it was making the question needlessly prominent to
add the amendment. In other words, they were willing to say
'vote' to the black man, but did not wish to say it so loudly and
plainly as to be heard too far.""
17. Benjamin F. Gue, "The Public Services of Hiram Price," Annals of
Iowa 1 (January 1895), 598.
18. Benjamin F. Gue, History of Iowa, 4 vols. (Des Moines, 1903), 3:1;
idem, "Hiram Price," 598. The speeches of Tracy and Sample are alluded to in
the official minutes and in Gue, History, 3:1. For identification of Tracy see
Edward H. Stiles, Recollections and Sketches of Notable Lawyers and Public
Men of Early Iowa (Des Moines, 1916), 306-308. Only the minutes refer to
remarks in opposition made by "Cowles, of Wapello," and this may well have
been a garbled reference to "Stiles, of Wapello." The standard biography of
Grinnell is Charles E. Payne, Josiah Bushneil Grinnell (Iowa City, 1938).
19. Iowa City Republican, 21 June 1865. Despite his disparaging remarks
about the convention's equivocators, in the same breath editor Brainerd
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After Edward H. Stiles, a young attorney and state
legislator from Ottumwa, had heatedly reiterated these
arguments, emphasizing again the political peril to Iowa
Republicanism introduced by the Russell amendment. Con-
gressman Hiram Price, Russell's colleague in the Scott County
delegation, could contain himself no longer. He rose to
challenge these dire prognostications."
Price, at age fifty-one, was the quintessential midwestern
Republican, a poor Pennsylvania farm boy who, by his own ef-
forts, had risen to become one of Iowa's leading bankers and
railroad capitalists. Stiles terms Price "an old-time radical aboli-
tionist," but this was a misapprehension. In 1846, two years
after moving to Davenport, Price had signed a petition calling
for a "north-western Liberty convention" to be held at Chicago,
but that appears to have been his only flirtation with aboli-
tionism." He remained a Democrat probably until 1854, when
the Whig-Free Soil coalition platform embraced the two pro-
grams closest to his heart: opposition to slavery extension into
the West and passage of a law prohibiting the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquors in Iowa. As longtime president of the
state's foremost temperance organization. Price helped write the
Iowa prohibitory law of 1855." The following year he was one
of the most active members of the convention that founded the
Iowa Republican party." At the outbreak of the war he was
mildly disapproved of the Russell amendment: "We think there was no
necessity for offering this amendment—that the original resolution was clear
and explicit. . . . " He later claimed to have voted for black suffrage in 1857.
See Berrier, "Negro Suffrage," 246. Brainerd is the same man quoted by Wub-
ben as hypothesizing in 1862 that Iowans would disapprove of racially in-
tegrated military units.
20. Stiles, Recollections and Sketches. 63. Stiles errs in recalling that "the
fourth resolution of the platform reported by the committee . . . recom-
mended the amendment of the State Constitution by striking out the word
'White' in the article on Suffrage," and he identifies Hiram Price as "un-
doubtedly the author of that plank." Stiles has, of course, confused the Russell
amendment with the original Resolution 4, and is obviously (and apparently
with no real evidence) suggesting Price's authorship of the amendment.
21. Gue, "Hiram Price," 585-587; Stiles, Recollections and Sketches, 63;
Davenport petition in Chicago Western Citizen, 1 April 1846.
22. "Free Democratic" platform in Sparks, "Birth of the Republican
Party," 7; Gue, "Hiram Price," 587-588, 592.
23. Price had been chairman of the 1856 Scott County delegation, the
convention's largest, and is judged by Pelzer to have been one of the three
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president of Iowa's state banking system and proved instrumen-
tal in organizing financial backing for the state's early military
buildup, becoming the impromptu paymaster for Iowa forces in
Missouri. In 1862 the voters of his district elected him to Con-
gress.^*
Price not only possessed a political stature to be reckoned
with, but was also a man not to be trifled with in public debate.
"He was both fiery and formidable," says Stiles, "and no man
ever left an encounter with him free of scars." (The seasoned
crowd-pleaser Henry Clay Dean had once refused to allow Price
to rebut a speech of his, even after Price offered ten dollars for
the privilege.) Now, on the floor of the 1865 GOP convention.
Price unleashed "a very scathing and heated speech," recalled
Stiles, "in reply to my own. . . . " Benjamin Gue recollected it
in somewhat less personal terms, but as no less forceful. The
congressman, he says, "made one of the great speeches of his
life. . . . Those who heard it will never forget the fervid elo-
quence, the sledge-hammer logic, or the powerful and irresisti-
ble appeal [that] poured forth in a torrent of righteous indigna-
tion that has seldom been surpassed."" Although the speech
"was entirely impromptu, and never reported or published,"
Gue remembered it as follows:
The Republican party is strong enough to dare to do right,
and cannot afford now, or at any other time, to shirk a duty. The
colored men. North and South, were loyal and true to the
Government in the days of its greatest peril. There was not a rebel
or traitor to be found among them. They ask the privilege of
citizenship now that slavery has been forever banished from our
country. Why should the great freedom-loving State of Iowa
longer deny them this right? Not one reason can be given that has
not been used to bolster up slavery for the past hundred years.
The war just closed has swept that relic of barbarism from our
most influential members of its platform committee. Pelzer, "Origin and
Organization," 510n. As leader of the antiliquor faction in that convention.
Price also led a determined, if unsuccessful, effort to obtain its endorsement of
prohibition. See Gue, "Hiram Price," 593-594; Pelzer, "Origin and Organiza-
tion," 508, 512-513; Sparks, "Birth of the Republican Party," 26-28.
24. Gue, "Hiram Price," 594-596, 597-598.
25. Stiles, Recollections and Sketches, 63, 135; Gue, "Hiram Price,"
596-599.
443
THE ANNALS OF IOWA
land; let the Republican party have the courage to do justice.
I have no fear of the result in a contest of this kind. We shall
carry the election and have the satisfaction of wiping out the last
vestige of the black code that has long been a disgrace to our
State."
'The timid delegates were shamed into silence," recalled
Gue, thereby implying that no further remarks were to be heard
from the amendment's opponents. Stiles, on the other hand,
says he "rejoined in the same spirit. The result was considerable
heat in the convention. . . . " Whatever the case, two other
leading notables also spoke in the amendment's behalf. One of
them, the eloquent Henry O'Connor, "was probably [Iowa's]
most popular political orator," asserts Stiles. The other. Lieu-
tenant Governor Eastman, an eccentric, homespun ex-Yankee
attorney from Eldora, also happened to be "a speaker of
unusual force. . . . He was a master of sarcasm, and no man
who knew him well," Stiles testifies, "ventured to invoke its
withering shafts." Eastman earlier had amused the delegates by
declining renomination in favor of "the next best man." Now his
and O'Connor's remarks on black suffrage, whatever their exact
substance, powerfully reinforced the effect of Price's stunning
eloquence."
The delegates then decided the issue in a roll call vote about
which the official minutes reveal only the result: 513V2 votes (58
percent) in favor of the Russell amendment, 242V'2 (28 percent)
against, and 123 votes (14 percent) not cast. The high political
standing and brilliant oratorical talents of Price, O'Connor, and
Eastman cleanly and clearly had carried the day against J. B.
Grinnell and his likeminded fellow-delegates who had urged
equivocation. It had been one of those moments, as Michael Les
Benedict has written of the national encounter with racism,
"that . . . once again testifies to the strength rather than the
26. Gue twice published this speech, and the two versions differ only
slightly. See Gue; "Hiram Price," 598; idem. History of Iowa. 3:1-2. •
27. Gue, "Hiram Price," 599; Stiles, Recollections and Sketches. 63. Both
the official minutes and Gue, History of Iowa. 3:1-2, note that O'Connor and
Eastman spoke in support of the amendment. For their backgrounds and
Stiles's remarks on their rhetorical abilities see Recollections and Sketches.
405-406, 708-712.
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weakness of the American egalitarian tradition."^'
If today we would tend to doubt either the efficacy of that
tradition or the sheer power of rhetoric on such an occasion as
this, we might well find modern behavioral research on white
racism helpful in overcoming skepticism. As perhaps the most
distinguished student of the subject, social psychologist Thomas
F. Pettigrew, has observed, race prejudice is a much more flexi-
ble phenomenon than was once thought, the reason being that
only some 15 percent of white adult Americans are un-
compromising racists whose extreme antiblack prejudices rise
"from largely authoritarian personality needs. . . . " At the
same time, "roughly 25 percent of white adults in the United
States consistently support full rights for Blacks and in most
situations will not exhibit antiblack attitudes or behavior." The
remainder, something like 60 percent, hold no deeply motivated
opinions about blacks, but will exhibit whatever racist—or
racially tolerant—attitudes and behavior their society's institu-
tions and opinion leaders appear to ask of them. It is this "con-
forming three-fifths" that can be persuaded, and in relatively
short order, to attitude change.^' "This process," adds Pet-
tigrew, ". . . contradicts conventional wisdom. It is commonly
held that [prejudiced] attitudes must change before behavior;
yet social psychological research points conclusively to the op-
posite order of events as more common. Behavior changes first,
because of new laws or other interventions; individuals then
modify their ideas to fit their new acts."'"
28. Benedict, "Racism and Equality," 19. The figure for votes not cast
was derived by subtracting the 756 ballots for and against the Russell amend-
ment from the 879 totals cast for candidates for governor and lieutenant
governor. Had these 123 uncast votes been entered in opposition to the
amendment, it still would have carried handily.
29! Pettigrew, "Mental Health Impact," 109-118 (quotes from 116).
30. Thomas F. Pettigrew et al.. Prejudice (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), 29.
What Pettigrew terms the "fait accompli phenomenon" underlying widespread
and often dramatic change in white racial attitudes is perfectly exemplified in
the sequence of public responses toward interracial marriage noted earlier: in
1963 only 36 percent of white Americans were against laws banning marriage
between blacks and whites; in 1967 the Supreme Court struck down all such
laws; in 1976 fully 66 percent opposed laws banning interracial marriage. The
Gallup poll complements these findir\gs by reporting that Americans posi-
tively approving marriage between whites and nonwhites rose from only 20
percent in 1968 to 43 percent in 1983. See note 9 above; Parade Magazine, 21
August 1983, p. 8. Pettigrew warns, however, that the phenomenon can also
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Historians and other scholars of American racism have
noted how little the basic components of antiblack prejudice
have evolved through the centuries, which encourages belief
that Pettigrew's model is as applicable to the 1860s as it has been
to the 1960s.^ ^ No other behavioral conceptualization so
satisfactorily explains how it was that a body of 663 men, most
of whose ideas about blacks were undoubtedly negative on the
morning of June 14, 1865, could by the evening of the same day
have voted overwhelmingly to bestow the elective franchise on
blacks. It had been a straightforward showdown between
"right" and "policy," concludes Benjamin Gue, "and right
prevailed over policy." Frank Palmer offered an even more
perceptive conclusion. "The Convention being thus brought to
a direct vote upon the [Russell] amendment," he noted, "and be-
ing unwilling to stand committed even in appearance against the
principle of negro suffrage, adopted the amendment by a large
majority, and the universal expression of the delegates after the
adjournment was that inasmuch as the issue must be squarely
work the other way: racial attitudes can be expected to retrogress whenever
the public receives retrogressive signals from its govemment and opinion
leaders. See Pettigrew, "Racial Change and Social Policy," Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social 'Science 441 (January 1979),
118-120. This, of course, is precisely what occurred in the United States from
the 1890s through World War I, with absolutely devastating effects on the
limited racial equality achieved in the Civil War era. See especially C. Vann
Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 3rd rev. ed. (New York, 1974).
In retrospect I discover that LaWanda Cox anticipated my employment of
Pettigrew's findings. "Neither can it be taken for granted that [racism] is im-
pervious to change," she writes. "There is no question but that racial attitudes
affect behavior, but it is also recognized that behavior affects racial attitudes,
though more slowly." Her backnote cites Pettigrew and others. See Cox, Lin-
coln and Black Freedom, 162, 215n.
31. The remarkably unchanging character of race prejudice is reflected in
the fact that the same wartime increase in antiblack attitudes by Iowa soldiers
campaigning in the South—made much of by Democratic editors in
1865—was replicated during World War II, when thousands of servicemen
from the North received military training in the South and, it is assumed,
became infected by southern racism. The presumed causal factor in 1861-1865
was therefore the same as in 1941-1945. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Regional
Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice," Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 59 (July 1959), 31, 35. That Union soldiers' antiblack attitudes
diminished in the later stages of the Civil War is argued by Marvin R. Cain, "A
'Face of Battle' Needed: An Assessment of Motives and Men in Civil War
Historiography," Ciui7 War History 28 (March 1982), 22-23.
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met, it might as well be met this year as next.""
The Iowa Republican party had done a good thing, and
had done it for precisely the right reason. That all it took was
for a few good men to act does not in the least diminish that
triumph.
As IT WAS in the 1865 Republican convention, so it was also, we
may presume, in the popular voting among loyal Republicans at
large on the matter of black suffrage: a minority happened to be
strongly racist; another minority happened to be strongly in
favor of black civil equality; the majority, holding no strong
position one way or another, came over to black suffrage at the
urgings of their political leaders. But there is no need to leave
this as a hypothetical proposition. With the aid of some simple
calculations we can determine the approximate relative political
strength of each of these three groups.
The extreme antiblack group within Republican ranks is
the easiest to identify in quantitative terms. Its members re-
vealed their numerical strength at the polls in 1868, when they
cast ballots for Ulysses S. Grant for president but then—despite
the strong urging of the party press, the party leadership, and
(allegedly) Crant himself—either cast "no" ballots on black suf-
frage or refused to vote at all on the proposal. There were no
more than about 15,000 of these voters, and they made up 13
percent of Grant's support." Altering the racism of such men,
according to modern social psychology, might well have re-
quired some nineteenth-century equivalent of clinical therapy,
but further close analysis of the 1868 referendum returns may
yet suggest something other than a psychogenic explanation for
much of this intransigence.^*
It is a bit more difficult, but far from impossible, to define
32. Gue, "Hiram Price," 599; Iowa State Register (w), 21 June 1865.
33. The official totals for both Grant and black sufforage are given in Ber-
rier, "Negro Suffrage," 258n. The assumption underlying my calculation is
that virtually all those who voted in favor of black suffrage in 1868 had also
voted for Grant—in other words, that virtually no 1868 Democrats knowingly
cast ballots in favor of black suffrage.
34. My ongoing research into the 1868 referendum is not yet complete,
but this much can be said: computer-aided regression analyses reveal that
those who voted for Grant but then voted against black suffrage do not appear
to have been merely recent Democrats; in fact, this group supported Grant
and suffrage in approximately equal measure. Specifically, about 15 percent of
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the egalitarian bloc at the opposite end of the spectrum. There
was not, as Wubben observes, much "bark" in those Iowans
who held strongly favorable^ positions on black suffrage, but
they existed, certainly enough, having offered a precise measure
of their strength back in 1857. Only 10 percent of all Iowans had
supported black suffrage that year, but—some 8,200 strong—
these Iowans made up fully 18 percent of those who had voted
Republican in the presidential election the previous fall. In 1857
this 18 percent voted for black suffrage even though their own
state leaders and all their editors but Jacob Rich, manager of a
small rural weekly, had disavowed the proposal. These non-
conformist Republicans thus clearly constituted an ideologically
problack hard core within the party, a rank-and-file constit-
uency which favored civil rights through inner convictions
presumably independent of, although supplementary to, strong
party loyalty."
This hard core made up nearly a fifth of the Republican
faithful in 1857, but its relative strength by 1865 or 1868 is
harder to estimate. I earlier demonstrated statistically that it
was still "in place" in 1868. "The .64 correlation between the
black suffrage referendum of 1857 and that of 1868," I noted on
that occasion, "reveals that the basic configuration of the [1868]
prosuffrage vote had congealed before the Civil War. . . .
What occurred between the 1857 and 1868 referenda was a
massive shift all across Iowa, wherein the prosuffrage percent-
age in every county rose dramatically, the altitude of its final
approval very much related to how progressive its vote had
been . . . in 1857.""
those who had supported the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in 1867
favored Grant the following year, with virtually the same percentage favoring
black suffrage. The statistical technique involved in these estimates is best
briefly described in Peyton McCrary et al., "Class and Party in the Secession
Crisis: Voting Behavior in the Deep South, 1856-1861," Journal of Inter-
disciplinary History 8 (Winter 1978), 431-435.
35. For Fremont's official returns see Rosenberg, Frontier State at War,
144; for the official total on black suffrage in 1857 see Berrier, "Negro Suf-
frage," 242n. Once again, my simple calculation assumes that virtually all
those who voted for black suffrage in 1857 had supported Fremont in 1856,
and that virtually no non-Republican knowingly favored black suffrage in
1857.
36. Dykstra, "Iowa," 185. A subsequent recalculation yielded a .65 cor-
relation between the two referenda.
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We may be almost sure that this egalitarian hard core did
not diminish in numerical size except through death and out-
migration: radical on black suffrage in 1857, surely radical as
well in 1868. And we may assume that it in fact increased in
size—like all voter groups—through in-migration, the coming
of age of new voters, and some ideological conversion of old
voters. But we may also presume that this egalitarian fifth lost
some relative strength within the party as more and more
disillusioned Democrats and Know Nothings (the mass presum-
ably conservative on racial issues) switched to the Republicans
in the late fifties and early sixties, even though some of
these—Enoch Eastman is a prominent example—would favor
rather than oppose black suffrage. A worst-case estimate,
whereby the egalitarian bloc is deemed numerically no larger in
number in 1868 than in 1857, would place its relative strength
within the party at 7 percent. A modest best-case estimate might
be that its percentage strength kept pace with the general in-
crease in Republican voters through the late fifties and sixties,
and that it stood at 18 percent in 1868 as well as eleven years
earlier. But for the sake of argument let us simply split the dif-
ference.
Thus we might divide the Republican rank-and-file on
black suffrage in early 1865 as follows: about 13 percent racist,
about 13 percent racially egalitarian, and about 74 percent "con-
forming bigots" who lacked strong inner convictions or
psychological needs related to blacks but who passively
reflected the racist norms embraced by the state's institutions,
its press, and, for the most part, the leaders of both its political
parties." It was this superficially racist three-quarters of the
Republican rank-and-file that the party's leadership successfully
converted to black suffrage in the summer and early autumn of
37. A month after the 1865 GOP convention an irascible Democratic
loyalist from Des Moines County confidentially reported his shock at
discovering how little the opposition to "Negro equality" among local
Republicans really stemmed from a deepseated racism. Although "some of
them (say, one third) declare that they never can vote for Negro suffrage," he
confided to the chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee, "my
own opinion in regard to this matter is that they don[']t have so much objec-
tion to the principal [sic] involved as they have (merely] to running the risque
of coming before the people upon that rather touchy question. . . . " See
Robert Robinson to Laurel Summers, 17 July 1865, Summers Papers, Iowa
State Historical Department, Des Moines.
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1865, leading directly to the referendum triumph three years
later."
Eighteen-sixty-five, that first postwar year, may well have
been the Iowa Republican party's finest moment, a political
season in which—against apparently formidable odds—it
mustered the moral courage to do justice in a matter of race. To-
day, when so many seem unaware that racial inequality remains
this nation's most important unresolved problem, when new
political initiatives seem so desperately needed, when the com-
placent tell us that there is no longer a problem and the hopeless
tell us that perhaps the problem is, after all, unresolvable, it is
good to have positive examples to prompt us. The strategies
that won nineteenth-century Iowans to the political equality of
blacks have always been relevant, and the more we know about
them the better.
38. For this paper I specifically tested Wubben's suggestion that Iowa
Methodists may have felt uniquely impelled to vote in favor of black suffrage
in 1868. My results suggest otherwise. As a surrogate variable for Methodists I
employed the well-known "church seats" data (despite their obvious limita-
tions they remain the only data generally available), extracting from the 1860
United States published census each county's Methodist percentage of all
enumerated church accommodations. These proportions correlate only -.06
and .13, respectively, with the 1860 Republican and Democratic presidential
votes, indicating that Iowa's Methodists were divided in their loyalties. The
correlation with favorable votes on black suffrage in 1868 is only -.02, in-
dicating that roughly as many Methodists opposed the measure as supported
it. I interpret these findings as meaning that about as many Iowa Methodists
were Democrats as Republicans, and that in 1868 Democratic Methodists
tended to heed the political line on black suffrage more than they did the
message sent by their national religious media.
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